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Abstract 
 
The poverty-trade openness relationship remains unclear in previous studies. Although 
considerable research has been devoted to the effect of trade liberalization on poverty, rather 
less attention has been paid to the impact of trade openness. This dissertation examines whether 
potential key complementary factors, such as financial development, democratic governance, 
and technological capabilities maximize the gains from trade openness. Using a panel of 
transition countries over the period 1990-2013 the paper confirms the lack of importance of 
complementary factors. Higher trade openness in its own is associated with an increase in 
extreme poverty. Besides, there is no significant estimated effect of trade openness on poverty 
reduction even if it is accompanied with well-developed financial sector and strong 
technological capabilities. The paper concludes that potential key complementarities do not 
appear in practice as such broad factors are not enough to overrun the negative effect of trade 
openness on poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the tenets of the transition process from centrally planned economies to market 
economies is that opening up to international trade improves economic performance (Desai, 
1997). On the other hand, extreme poverty as a matter of social welfare still exists. In transition 
economies, absolute poverty is falling very sharply at the same time countries improve their 
participation in the international trade1. Trade openness has been one of the most important 
economic policies after moving from closed to an open economy. To which extent opening up 
to international trade affects extreme poor people is the key motivation for this dissertation.  
 
Opening up to international trade does not guarantee success. It opens up opportunities for 
those people who are willing or able to take advantage of them. In most cases very poor are at 
the very bottom of the pecking order in terms of ability to exploit trade opportunities. Trade 
should not be seen in isolation. Even if there is a pro-growth effect, it still requires 
complementarities in order to reduce poverty (Topalova, 2004; Harrison, 2006/2008/2013; Le 
Goff and Singh, 2014). Under these circumstances, complementary factors should accompany 
trade openness to enhance the ability of poor people to satisfy basic needs2. This does not imply 
that they are always necessary to enable trade to have poverty reducing effects—it strongly 
depends on the country groups which are studied (Winters et al., 2004).  
 
The dissertation aims to find out whether trade openness reduces poverty in transition 
economies. In order to achieve this aim, this study includes two research tasks3. First, whether 
trade openness can alone reduce poverty in transition countries. Second, whether potential key 
complementary factors financial development, democratic governance and technological 
capabilities enhance the effectiveness of trade for poverty reduction4. Easier loans and cheap 
credits improve firm productivity and the benefits of trade openness will trickle down to the 
poor workers. Firms which have strong technological capability enable the poor to benefit from 
knowledge transfers via international trade. Lastly, more efficient allocation of goods and 
                                                          
1 See Appendix 1.  
2 Poverty is a deprivation in well-being and comprehends a set of important dimensions: low level of health, 
education and living standards (World Bank, 2010). 
3 The diagram in Appendix 2 represents two research tasks in a more illustrative way. 
4 They are not the only factors that may matter. Based on the available data in transition countries these are the 
ones which I can analyze in econometric analyzes. Due to data limitations, it was not possible to empirically test 
the effect of other potential key complementary factors, such as labor market flexibility, firm entry exist flexibility, 
corruption, political instability, roads and irrigation. 
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services increases trade intensity under democratic governance. Furthermore, an income which 
people get from greater openness to trade could be more likely to spread equally.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is that it observes how some key country-specific factors 
affect the link between trade openness and poverty in transition countries. This study focuses 
on the empirical relationship between poverty and trade openness by using a panel of 28 
transition countries over the period 1990–2013. There is a lack of empirical studies on the 
trade-poverty relationship in transition countries, which is another motivation for this research. 
The literature review of present study focuses on the abundant literature relating to the 
relationship between trade and poverty reduction in the least developed and developing 
countries (Winter et al ., 2004; Topalova , 2004; Agenor, 2004; Harrison , 2006/2008/2013; Le 
Goff  and Singh, 2014).  
   
In this study results show that higher trade openness in its own is associated with an increase 
in poverty which is similar to findings of empirical studies of Le Goff and Singh (2014) for 
African countries. However, results contradict the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
trade. A key novel finding of this dissertation is that undertaking the investigated 
complementary broad factors combined with trade openness do not necessarily reduce poverty, 
as one could possibly expect in theory. The gains from trade openness according to the findings 
of this dissertation are limited because the benefits do not trickle down to the poor. This result 
likely reflects the fact that the poor do not actively participate in the welfare. Moreover, the 
transition from closed economy to open one is accompanied by technological changes. So, 
skilled labor might be more demanded than unskilled labor on the job market in transition 
countries. In this case, the poor cannot avoid the costs of trade openness. 
 
There is no doubt that trade openness improve overall economic performance in transition 
countries but gains from greater openness to trade may not be equally distributed among the 
poor and the rich. The potential costs of trade openness (higher income inequality) most likely 
outweigh potential benefits (higher overall growth)5 in transition countries. The empirical 
findings support the idea that greater income inequality is a consequence of greater openness 
to trade in poor countries (Milanovic and Squire, 2005; Easterly, 2006). Naschold (2002) 
claims that poverty reduction can be considerably improved by income equality. Higher trade 
                                                          
5Dollar and Kraay (2013) suggest that trade leads to faster growth.  
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openness might drive people into deeper poverty because higher income inequality is 
associated with higher poverty. This dissertation does not focus on inequality but it is 
worth mentioning, however, that poverty and inequality are intimately linked. That is why I 
can suggest that an equal income distribution would be an important step forward for poverty 
reduction. 
 
The results provide clear evidence that there is a lack of complementary factors such as 
financial development, democratic governance and technological capabilities in transition 
countries. Furthermore, if the government becomes more democratic in transition countries, 
the interaction of democratic governance with trade openness becomes significant and 
positive6.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ambiguous effect of trade 
openness on poverty and the role of potential key complementary factors. In section 3, data 
used to perform the empirical analysis and methodology are described. Sections 4, 5 and 6 offer 
some results and concluding remarks.  
 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Trade openness and poverty  
 
This section aims to review the literature upon which my empirical analysis is based. It starts 
with the theoretical analysis of the impact of trade openness on poverty. Then, I discuss the 
potential key complementary factors that can enhance the beneficial effects of trade openness 
on poverty reduction. Agenor (2004) claims that trade can affect the poor in various ways. 
Trade openness might be either beneficial or harmful for the poor. Therefore, empirical 
analyses of the impact are important in order to figure out net effects on the poor. 
The results from cross-country and case studies remain unclear (Winters et al., 2004; Ravallion, 
2004; Harrison, 2006).  
                                                          
6 Individual perception bias is a main limitation of democracy measure. In this study, institutionalized democracy 
is drawn from broadly used POLITY IV dataset. It is about how much the president is checked by parliament. The 
other possibility to measure democracy which is not estimated in this dissertation is democracy index from 
Freedom House. On the other hand, it measures human rights and freedom. 
  
 
8 
 
 
There exists a gap between the theoretical and empirical literature of trade openness and 
poverty, particularly there is often a lack of clear differentiating of notions of trade 
liberalization and trade openness in the related literature linking trade and poverty7. Trade 
openness is not always a result of trade liberalization. Importantly, they are related notions but 
not the same. Trade liberalization involves reductions in trade barriers which lead to increase 
openness to trade, whereas more openness increases the overall magnitude of exports and 
imports over time. Some economists define freer trade as openness in trade (Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan, 2002), others describe it as just a trade intensity (Pritchett, 1996). However, 
according to Harrison (2006), trade openness and trade liberalization is associated with fewer 
trade tariffs.  
 
Literature offers two approaches to the analysis of the effect of trade on poverty: static and 
dynamic (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 2002). In the static approach, many economists focus on 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theorem to investigate trade effects on inequality and poverty 
(Harrison, 2006; Le Goff and Singh, 2014). The Heckscher-Ohlin model suggests that after 
opening to international trade countries will specialize and export the goods in which they are 
factor abundant (Ohlin, 1933). Transition countries present high ratio of labor to capital (Lane 
et al., 2002). Therefore, according to Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, they have a comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive goods. More trade openness in transition countries might 
encourage the development of labor-intensive activities and provide income for poor people. 
The Stolper–Samuelson theorem (SST) is a basic theorem in Heckscher–Ohlin trade model 
which claims that the abundant factor (poor unskilled labor) sees an increase in its real income 
(wage) when a country opens up to international trade (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941).   
 
Evidence against Heckscher-Ohlin model is based on the findings of Davis and Mishra (2006), 
who point out that SST holds only in the case if imported goods can be substituted by exported 
goods. In addition, they claim that if all goods are produced in labor abundant countries then 
SST suggests an increase in wages of the poor (unskilled labor). An important implication of 
                                                          
7 Le Goff and Singh (2014), Winter et al. (2004), Chang et al. (2009), Kpodar and Singh (2011) use trade openness 
for empirical analysis, but their literature review’s main part is based on trade liberalization. One reason for this 
is that there are few theoretical and empirical literature on poverty-trade openness relationship. There are many 
papers about trade liberalization and poverty which are relevant. In this dissertation, I use trade openness as a key 
variable, on the other hand, this study focuses on both trade liberalization and trade openness in the literature 
review.   
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this evidence is that specific sector model is much more realistic than HO model. According to 
specific sector model gains from international trade are allocated among poor workers 
according to sectors where they are employed (Harrison, 2006). She claims that if the poor 
work in the export-oriented sector, their real wages increase. They become winners. If they are 
employed in import-competing sectors, they are losers. In contrast to this evidence, Heckscher-
Ohlin model suggests that winners and losers can be recognized according to whether they are 
employed in labor intensive or capital intensive industries (Harrison, 2006). Likewise, 
Topalova (2004) finds that trade tariffs are negatively correlated with poverty due to the 
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors in India. Workers cannot easily move from one sector 
to another in developing countries. If regulations allow workers to easily relocate among firms, 
then the negative effect of trade on poverty reduction will fade away over time.   
 
In dynamic approach, trade openness promotes economic growth, which in its own supports 
poverty reduction. In the last decade, some economists have suggested that trade openness is 
related to rapid growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995). But on the other hand, growth does not have 
consistent effects on income distribution (Ravallion, 1995; Squire et al., 1998). In later studies, 
Dollar and Kraay (2013) claim that trade liberalization is a reason of growth in average income 
category. Consequently, there is an increase in income of people in the bottom quintile, leading 
poverty reduction. There is a significant problem of causality. Rodrik et al. (2001) emphasize 
that trade openness can be a result rather than a necessity for growth. However, based on the 
dynamic approach the effective engine to alleviate poverty is trade, which has at first positive 
effect on economic growth and this, in turn, is the key to poverty reduction. 
    
Cross-country studies have no clear-cut conclusion on the effect of trade on poverty (Beck et 
al., 2007; Kpodar and Singh, 2011). There is a rapidly growing literature on trade and poverty, 
which indicates a strong negative relationship (Spilimbergo et al., 1999; Fischer, 2001; 
Easterly, 2002). But others criticize the robustness and significance of the poverty reduction 
through trade because greater opening up to international trade also leads to higher inequality 
(Besley and Burgess, 2003; Milanovic and Squire, 2005; Easterly, 2006).  
 
A number of recent studies resolve the ambiguity of the impact of trade on poverty. They 
suggest that there should be other conditions that give opportunities for poor people to have 
gains from greater trade openness (Winters, 2004; Le Goff and Singh, 2014). Harrison (2006) 
suggests that globalization is more likely to benefit poor when there are complementary 
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policies such as wide investments in human capital, technological support for farmers, low 
inflation, good institutions, policies which encourage private credits and infrastructure. Poor 
people need better education and access to finance in order to benefit from trade. Le Goff and 
Singh (2014) claim that higher poverty reduction is associated with higher trade openness in 
African countries only if they have a well-developed financial sector, strong human capital and 
high quality of bureaucracy. Winters et al. (2004) show that countries without restrictions on 
trade have faster economic growth than countries with tariff barriers. Besides complementary 
policies might allow farmers to benefit from trade openness, particularly via infrastructure and 
agricultural extension services. Grown (2014) tests the impact of trade on the distribution of 
income among men versus women. She claims that complementary policies of access to 
secondary education, stronger property rights and access to credit markets play a significant 
role for women in Africa and South Asia. Developing countries have liberalized their policies 
over the last twenty years, but there has not been much development in some other conditions 
like infrastructure, irrigation, access to credit, education and health services. Thus, even though 
trade has been liberalized, little success for poverty reduction has been achieved (Balat and 
Porto, 2004). The literature shows no consensus on trade-poverty relationship meaning that 
potential key complementary factors are needed.  
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Potential key complementary factors 
 
As previous literature has outlined the role of complementarities, in this section I will take a 
closer look at potential complementary factors that might enhance the beneficial effects of trade 
openness on poverty. There are some key country-specific characteristics which might have a 
relevant impact on the diffusion of benefits from trade openness on poor people, such as 
education, irrigation, infrastructure, health, agricultural extension services, bureaucracy 
quality, financial depth, democratic governance, technological capability, labor market 
flexibility, corruption, political instability and business regulation. They should be 
implemented simultaneously with trade openness to help the poor and avoid absolute poverty. 
This dissertation focuses only on three of them, financial development, technological 
capability, and democratic governance.  
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The reasons why focusing on these complementarities are as follows. Without well-developed 
financial sector firms do not have access to cheaper financial resources, so they will not be able 
to expand their production and actively participate in trading system. Firms which have the 
capability of adapting technologies gain a competitive advantage on the market. They are able 
to produce and export goods efficiently. And finally, under democratic government, there is 
more efficient allocation of goods and services which are more likely to maximize gains from 
trade. Generally, these country-specific factors which are studied in this dissertation are broad. 
First, infrastructure and education are part of technological capabilities, they are sub-indicators 
for this index (Fagerberg, 2007/2008/2009). Second, inflation determines the effect of financial 
development on the poor (Harrison, 2006). Third, corruption is linked to governance system, 
mostly to democratic government (Czap et al., 2012). In addition, there is an absence of 
empirical studies on these complementarities, which is another reason to focus only on 
mentioned country-specific factors.  
 
There is potential evidence that trade openness combined with financial development, 
technological capabilities and democratic governance plays a significant role in poverty 
reduction. Firstly, the direct effects of these country-specific characteristics on poverty are 
analyzed. By discussing the validity of potential key complementary factors I aimed to reveal 
their direct effects on poverty reduction. Based on earlier studies trade openness alone can also 
be expected to increase extreme poverty (Winters et al., 2004; Agenor, 2004). In order to 
overrun possible negative effects on poverty, potential key complementary factors would affect 
poverty not only interacted with trade openness, but they should also have positive direct 
effects on poverty reduction. Trade openness can be either costly or helpful for the poor. There 
might be negative effects of trade. If potential key complementary factors do not have sufficient 
positive effects on poverty reduction, then the costs of trade openness will outweigh the 
benefits, so the poor will not be better off. Next sections show that the direct positive effects 
of financial development, technological capabilities, and democratic governance, on poverty 
reduction is not always the case in the empirical literature8. Therefore, the joint effects might 
be dominated by the cost of trade openness. Second, I will describe the combined effect of 
trade openness with three different country-specific factors.  
 
 
                                                          
8  See Appendix 3. 
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2.2.1. Financial development and poverty: direct links  
 
Empirical studies on financial development and income distribution show that financial 
deepening can improve growth levels and in return reduce income inequality (Beck et al., 
2007). Well-developed financial sector increases an income of the poor more than average 
growth, particularly this ends up with lower income inequality. Similarly, Kpodar and 
Guillaumont (2011) argue that well-developed financial sector reduces poverty directly and 
also indirectly through economic growth. In contrast to Beck et al. (2007), Kpodar and 
Guillaumont (2011) do not focus only on private credit indicator, but also examine the impact 
of the ratio of money to GDP9. When private credit is used, the relationship between financial 
development and poverty becomes statistically insignificant.  
 
While some economists agree that private credit has a significant effect on poverty reduction, 
others find a lack of any evidence of an impact of financial development on absolute poverty. 
Fowowe and Abidoye (2013) and Chigumira and Masiyandima (2003) claim that financial 
development will not provide the cheaper and easier loans for extreme poor. Main reason for 
not offering loans to the poor is a high risk of default and problem with moral hazard. Similarly, 
Caner and Arestis (2004) suggest that if financial development is achieved without maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, it often ends up with crises and also increases economic inequality. 
Countries which have integrated financial markets should be careful because poor households 
suffer from currency crisis much more than rich people (Harrison, 2006).  
 
  
Financial development and trade openness: combined effect on poverty 
 
Financial development is considered as an essential factor for economic growth. Recently 
considerable attention has been paid to complementarity of trade openness and financial 
development (Shin and Yang, 2006). Firms are more likely to be export-oriented if they are 
bounded by lower credit constraints (Melitz, 2004). Credit constraints matter for export. By 
exporting labor-intensive goods firms get profit and poor unskilled workers employed in these 
firms could potentially get higher wages as a result. Export activities are positively associated 
                                                          
9 The result that financial development is good for the poor holds only when financial development is measured 
by the ratio of money to GDP (M3/GDP). Based on available data in transition countries I use only private 
credit/GDP indicator. 
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with well-developed financial sector. If local goods produced by poor people are not competing 
with imported goods then trade would lead to increase real incomes of the poor (Harrison, 
2006). However, there is a consensus that higher import competition leads to increase poverty 
rates (Davis and Mishra, 2006; Harrison, 2013). When the poor are employed in import-
competing sectors, this increases a duration of unemployment and also rises informality, which 
caused higher poverty in South Africa (Davies and Thurlow, 2009). The previous studies 
indicate that potential key complementary factor - financial development is pro-growth and by 
combining this effect with trade openness is beneficial for poor (Le Goff and Singh, 2014; 
Chang et al., 2009).   
 
More financial opportunities enhance business and create new jobs, as a result, poor people get 
hired.  Well-developed financial sector increases the capacity to give more loans and cheaper 
credits to firms, so more goods are produced efficiently. Moreover, participation in the trading 
system will be much beneficial for poor workers. According to Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
theorem, if countries are labor abundant then they will export labor-intensive goods. Under 
well-developed financial sector they will export more these types of goods, so the poor who 
are employed will experience an increase in real income when a country opens up to 
international trade. HO assumes labor mobility across sectors (not countries), but if firms are 
enhanced by financial resource availability, the poor can more easily move to sectors with 
comparative advantage. And given the assumption of perfect mobility of employees across 
sectors, these together should bring a change in employment structure. 
 
 
2.2.2. Democratic governance and poverty: direct links 
The relationship between poverty and democracy is ambiguous. Ross (2006) claims that 
democracy does not function well for poor individuals. He claims that democracy does not 
influence infant and child mortality rates which are used as a proxy for measure of welfare of 
the poor. It is true that democratic government spends more money on health and education 
than authoritarian, but this kind benefits are for middle and rich groups, not for poor 
individuals.  
Varshney (2002) suggests that democratic countries do not have better effects than 
authoritarian regimes in support of poverty reduction in developing countries. There is no long-
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run relationship between democracy and growth when democratization is accompanied by the 
poor rule of law. Such countries face poor civil rights, high-income inequalities and 
differences in efficiency between firms. A similar analysis is done by Popov and Polterovich 
(2005), who find that democracy negatively impacts economic growth in transition countries. 
Likewise, Fabella and Oyales (2008) find that when democracy is seen in isolation then more 
democratic governance is negatively associated with poverty reduction in developing countries. 
However, when trade openness interacts with democratic government the result becomes 
positive. 
 
Democratic governance and trade openness: combined effect on poverty  
Democracy is broadly known as one of the goals of development. It is important to investigate 
the relation to other goals, such as poverty reduction and more income equality, higher life 
expectancy and educational levels. A democratic governance may be more likely to ensure that 
trade openness reduces poverty in African countries (Oyeshile, 2009). Rational and law-based 
trading system will work under the democratic government. Trade openness should be 
complemented with democratic governance to reinforce its contribution to economic growth 
and to provide opportunities for poor people that growth creates (Fabella and Oyales, 2008).  
 
Democratic government is known as a standard-setter. It maintains the benefits of trade 
openness. Firms need support from the government, in terms of low formal and informal costs, 
which means to be corruption free. One of the primary aims of democracy is the elimination of 
corruption which would enhance beneficial effects of trade openness. It might increase wages 
that are good for the poor who are working in these firms.  
 
There is less efficient allocation of resources under corruption which leads higher losses from 
trade. Corruption is an informal tax that is costly for overall welfare (Tanzi, 1998). Income 
distributions are mostly regulated and controlled by the government. Higher corruption index 
leads to increase income inequality (Gupta et al., 2002). Czap et al. (2012) claim that corruption 
is lower in countries which have unstable democratic government and higher in stable 
authoritarian governance. The reason why corruption may be lower in democratic governance 
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is that elections are much more frequent than in authoritarian countries, this creates uncertainty 
and people do not know whom to corrupt (Bohara et al., 2004).   
 
Corruption weakens income, expenditure on health, education and government effectiveness 
to reduce poverty (Tanzi, 1998). What we can say exactly is that government system which 
encourages the development of native business and enterprise is the source to lift people out of 
poverty. How poor people benefit from trade openness depends mostly on the role of 
government. Democratic government is associated with lower corruption, which in turn leads 
to a decrease in trade barriers and an increase in trade openness (Bandyopadhyay and Roy, 
2006). So, it could be expected that the positive effects of trade on poverty will be stronger in 
a country with lower corruption and more democratic system of governance. Due to low 
corruption, the income from trade are less likely to be appropriated by rich people, particularly 
free corruption is a reason for income equality (Gupta et al., 2002). 
 
 
2.2.3. Technological capabilities and poverty: direct links 
 
Technological development is the driving force of long-term economic development (Sollow, 
1957). If developing countries have strong technological capabilities and good accessibility to 
knowledge then they might be able to reduce poverty (Ventura, 2001). But this type of 
economic growth could not eradicate poverty in African countries (Bhalla, 2002). 
 
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008/2009) found impediments which less-developed countries face 
in their catching up process with developed countries. They suggest that economic 
development strongly requires to be accompanied by technological capabilities. On the other 
hand, technological capabilities have an insignificant effect on development if it is not 
supported by social institutions such as education, governance and also religions. If there are 
some impediments to technological capability this will be an obstacle for economic 
development and also poverty reduction. 
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Technological Capabilities and trade openness: combined effect on poverty 
 
Kim (2000, p: 11) defines technological capabilities (TC) as “the ability to make effective use 
of technological knowledge in production, engineering, and innovation in order to sustain 
competitiveness in price and quality”. Technological capabilities are important for 
technological development and technology transfers. It enables firms to accelerate innovation 
and improve economic environment. The idea that economic growth has recognized 
technological capabilities as its driving engine goes back to Joseph Schumpeter.  
 
People are able to take advantage of new opportunities offered by trade openness when 
countries have strong technological capabilities. Neoclassical and endogenous growth theories 
suggest that technological differences across countries are the main reason of economic 
inequality in the world (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990).  
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) examine the role of persistent investment in technological 
activities which are significant to create “absorptive capacity”. It is defined as “the ability of a 
firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and apply it to 
commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p: 128). 
Trade openness complemented with strong technological capability has an international flow 
of technology and knowledge among people and firms that increase standards of living, 
therefore easing absolute poverty. Recently, several authors Harrison (2013) and Hall et al. 
(2013) have proposed how trade openness affects inequality through important channels of 
innovation and technology. Innovation is a source of better productivity and greater revenue 
per employee, which in its own affects income distribution. As mentioned above, Naschold 
(2002) links lower inequality to lower poverty and claims that unequal income distribution 
might be a reason of higher poverty.  
 
Technological capability is also known as the capacity to create technologies. Absorptive 
capacity, human capital, and technological capabilities are prerequisites for effective 
technology transfer via international trade, which is an important diffusion channel (Keller, 
2004). Chen and Gupta (2006) figure out trade openness and growth relationship through 
knowledge spillovers. If firms have strong technological capabilities where poor people are 
employed, then they can more easily learn from foreign knowledge transferred via international 
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trade. These additional positive effects of exposure to trade might potentially trickle down to 
the poor as well. This can have special effects on performance of firms and at the same time 
on wages of the poor employed in these firms. This might create new technologies and use of 
productive resources efficiently, which is expected to be a long-run factor of firm growth.  
 
To sum up, based on the previous studies, no certain agreement has been established on the 
effects of trade openness on poverty. Despite the strong evidence that trade openness generates 
growth, there is no clear theoretical and empirical claim for ways through which trade might 
have an effect on poverty reduction. However, this section has analyzed and explained the trade 
openness effects on poverty by focusing on some country-specific factors that would change 
the trade–poverty relationship. 
 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data  
 
A series of cross-country studies on trade-poverty relationship focus on the least developed and 
developing countries. Using a broad sample, which has higher degrees of freedom, would 
remain problematic because it may introduce unwanted heterogeneity (Ravallion, 2004; 
Harrison, 2006; Kpodar and Guillaumont, 2011). To avoid this problem the present study focus 
only on the transition countries, data are available for a limited number of years which dictated 
the size of panel dataset10. 
 
There is high variability in poverty levels over time, but on average poverty rates have declined 
in transition countries11. In some countries, population continues living on less than 1.90 $US 
a day while high-income transition countries almost eradicated poverty12. The summary 
statistics for trade openness and poverty rates are presented in Appendix 5. 
 
                                                          
10 Detailed data sources are provided in Appendix 4. 
11 The number of people who live on less than $1.90/day has decreased intensively in the last decades (Word 
Bank, 2015). 
12 A high-income economy is defined by the World Bank as a country with a gross national income (GNI) per 
capita above US$12,735 in 2014. In transition economies, following countries are high-income countries: Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. See Appendix 6. 
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The dataset covers the period of 1990-2013 and contains a sample of 28 transition countries13 
(see Appendix 7). The incidence of poverty (headcount index) and depth of poverty (poverty 
gap) at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP)14 are used as a proxy of absolute poverty. Lopez and Serven 
(2009) claim that poverty data is problematic because there are many missing values for several 
countries. Limited availability of data on poverty indicators is a problem for the analysis. 
Minimum periods T=3 without gaps are needed to run the regression and use an instrumental 
variables method. To avoid missing gaps, 3-years averages of each variable are taken. 
 
The main objective of the thesis is to examine how poverty-trade openness relationship is 
influenced by potential key complementary factors. The empirical part of dissertation starts 
with a linear classical poverty model. Then, in order to perform analysis on complementarities, 
it is shown whether financial development, technological capabilities, and democratic 
governance enhance potential benefits of trade openness on poverty. 
 
 
 
3.2. Model and methodology 
 
The point of departure for an analysis is a standard regression equation of the classical poverty 
model15 as follows: 
 
Pi,t= β1OPi,t + β2CVi,t + θt + φi + εi,t         (1) 
 
where Pi,t is the log of poverty indicator for a country i at a period t, CV represents control 
variables and OP is a key explanatory variable, trade openness; θt is unobserved time effects 
and φi  is country-specific effects; εi,t is the error term. 
 
Following Chang et al. (2009), Kpodar and Singh (2011) and Le Goff and Singh (2014), I add 
potential key complementary factors as interaction terms to have some country characteristics 
effects on poverty through trade openness. New regression equation is the following: 
                                                          
13 Other transition countries are excluded due to data unavailability.  
14 In October 2015, World Bank updated international poverty line to $1.90 a day. 
15 See Dollar and Kraay (2001), Kpodar and Singh (2011), Guillaumont and Kpodar (2011) and Le Goff and 
Singh (2014). 
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Pi,t= β1OPi,t + β2CVi,t + β3OPi,t*cvi,t + θt + φi + εi,t (2) 
 
where cvi,t corresponds to the level of financial development, technological capabilities, and 
democratic governance in the country i at time t. 
 
This study applies cross-country analysis with two poverty indicators. Headcount index, which 
is the proportion of a population that lives below the poverty line and poverty gap which is the 
mean shortfall in consumption or income from the poverty line16. As a dependent variable, this 
study uses poverty headcount and poverty gap considering the $1.90 poverty line. The key 
explanatory variable, trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. 
 
Control variables - GDP per capita to control for economic development; inflation to control 
for macroeconomic instability (Loayza et al., 2004); health expenditure to control for health 
status across countries which covers the provision of health services and nutrition activities; 
financial depth which is represented by private credit over GDP; a good indication of the 
democracy and autocracy of a country is measured by the polity score. It is drawn from the 
Polity IV database which is commonly used in many studies (Popov and Polterovich, 2005; 
Ross 2005/2006; Fabella and Oyales, 2008)17; technological capability index is constructed by 
factor analysis. 
 
To construct the technological capability index the missing data are estimated by the hot deck 
imputation procedure18. Full coverage in the dataset allows us to estimate factor loadings and 
variances in factor analysis method. Fagerberg and Srholec (2007/2008/2009) introduces a 
modified factor analysis approach to develop a technological capability index. Moreover, they 
create indices of the education system, innovation system, governance, financial system, 
business regulation, social capital, political system, openness, social capability, poverty trap 
and formal democracy. The plot in Appendix 8 shows the factor score19 on the technological 
capability against GDP per capita for transition countries,  results obtained in our analysis are 
                                                          
16 Based on World Bank definition.  
17 I use only two scales from the database: the autocracy scale and the democracy scale. 
18 Schonlau (2006) - in Stata 13.0. 
19 See Appendix 9 for an overview of the factor scores by country. 
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similar to findings from Fagerberg and Srholec (2008), who claim that there is positive 
relationship between technological capability and GDP per capita (in PPPs) in developed and 
developing countries. This framework confirms the theory of convergence, which states that 
poorer economies "catch-up" in their use of technology (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990).  
 
To conduct factor analysis, it is necessary to know how many factors to use, and also determine 
loadings (Milan and Whittaker, 1995)20. Based on previous studies, I use weighting scheme, 
where each weight is between zero and one, which creates an index of technological capability 
(Fagerberg and Srholec, 2007/2008/2009). The most important part is how to come up with 
some value for the weight for each indicator of technological capability. Factor analysis is 
intended to find these weights. The correlation between technological capabilities and sub-
indicators will determine how movement occurs in the indicator variables as technological 
capability changes. An equation for technological capabilities index is following;  
 
       𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝐼𝑈𝑖,𝑡𝐼𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + +  𝜔𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜔𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡                        (3)                     
                                                                                                                                      
Where ω is the weight each score is given and γ is some random term. Also, the subscripts i 
and t represent country and time period, respectively;   
 
Sub-indicators: Internet users (IU), PCT international patent applications (PCT), research and 
development expenditure (RD), trademark applications (TR), secondary school enrollment 
(SE), tertiary school enrollment (TE), fixed telephone subscriptions (FT) and primary school 
pupil-teacher ratio (PT). When conducting technological capabilities index, the correlations 
between mentioned sub-indicators determine weight ω which I have used in equation (3). 
Several econometric problems may arise from estimating equations (1) and (2). Frankel and 
Romer (1999) claim that there is a causal relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth, which implies endogeneity of trade openness. Many studies claim that trade 
                                                          
20 Some indicators of following countries are excluded in factor analysis while constructing technological 
capability index. There are no data for:   
1.Trademark data for Armenia   
2.Patent and R&D for Albania, Croatia, Laos       
3.Primary school pupil-teacher ratio for Montenegro 
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liberalization also has a strong causal effect on income (Feyrer, 2009). In addition, regressors 
might be correlated with the error terms due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  
 
 
At first, the benchmark of classical poverty model is estimated by pooled OLS, random effects 
and fixed effects model. Next, equations (1) and (2) are estimated using the System Generalized 
Method-of-Moment (GMM) to take into account country-specific effects and the possible 
endogeneity21. The system GMM estimation procedure is adopted because Blundell and Bond 
(1998) suggest that first difference GMM may suffer from weak instrumentation when dataset 
is not too large. Estimated coefficients and z-statistics based on the one-step GMM estimates 
are presented in this study22.  Another option might be to estimate dynamic poverty model, but 
when they are implemented, they have inferior results and not suitable for estimating the causal 
effect23. The reliability of the GMM estimation depends very much on whether lagged values 
of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the poverty regression. A serial correlation 
test shows that there is no second-order correlation in error term24 and Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions demonstrates that instruments are valid. 
 
4. Results 
 
Before estimating regression equations of classical poverty model through econometric 
analysis, the present study takes into account the plots presented in Figure 1. They compare the 
poverty-trade openness relationship in the top country group and the bottom group country in 
terms of technological capability, democratic governance, and financial development25. Plots 
clearly suggest that the effect of trade openness on poverty varies by potential key 
complementary factors26.  
                                                          
21 To avoid over-instrumentation, the “collapse” option of xtabond2 for STATA.13 is used, which is recommended 
by Roodman (2006). While the right-hand side variables in equation (2) and (3) are treated as predetermined or 
suspected endogenous variables, they are instrumented by their second valid lagged values.  
See Le Goff and Singh (2014) and Kpodar and Singh (2011). 
22 See Kpodar and Singh (2011). 
23 See Appendix 10 column 3. 
24 No serial autocorrelation can be explained as follows. Let uit be the error term for country i in period t. 
Second-order serial correlation is given by E (uit-uit-1) (uit-2-uit-3) = E (utuit-2-uitut-3 –uit-1uit-2+uit-1uit-3) = 0.  
25 Countries are named as the top (bottom) group if their mean of financial development, democratic governance 
and technological capability are above (below) the median in the sample.  
26 See Chang et al. (2009) and Le Goff and Singh (2014). 
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Figure 1. Incidence of poverty and trade openness for top and bottom groups 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
When trade-poverty relationship depends on the technological capability and financial 
development there is a strong negative relationship in the top country group, on the other hand, 
there is no clear or even positive relationship in the bottom group. In the case of democratic 
governance, the situation is the opposite, countries which are below median (more authoritarian 
government) have less poverty, but trade-poverty relationship becomes positive in top group 
or shows no clear relationship. 
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Table 1. Benchmark classical poverty model  
 
Dependent variable: Poverty 
Headcount ratio (log)                        Pooled OLS Random effects model Fixed effects model  
Trade openness (log)  -0.258 0.275 1.782**  
 (-0.669) (0.562) (2.471) 
Health expenditure (log) -0.516 0.013 1.161 
 (-1.297) (0.025) (1.526) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.353*** -1.420*** -1.447**  
  (-7.887) (-6.014) (-2.496)    
Inflation (log) -0.235* -0.093 -0.032 
 (-1.779) (-0.721) (-0.230)    
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.121 -0.315* -0.560*** 
 (-0.713) (-1.877) (-3.141)    
Polity -0.039* -0.038 -0.034 
 (-1.673) (-1.153) (-0.590)    
Technological capabilities -0.372 -0.432** -0.440**  
 (-1.621) (-2.078) (-2.009)    
Constant 14.739*** 10.655*** -0.006 
 (7.442) (4.033) (-0.001)    
Breusch-Pagan (p_value)  0.002  
Hausman (p_value)   0.018 
Number of countries 28 28 28 
Number of observations 144 144 144 
Time effects YES YES YES 
R-squared overall 0.693 0.665 0.451 
  
      Notes: Data are averaged over three years.   
                 Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
                *   Significant at 10%    ** Significant at 5%    *** Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
Next step is to estimate econometric models. The fixed effect model is preferred to pooled OLS 
and random effects models, which is confirmed by Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests. Results 
in Table 1 column (3) coincides with results in Table 2 column (1). So, the benchmark classical 
poverty model estimated by fixed effects model and system GMM is similar in terms of their 
key results about the relationship between trade openness and poverty. The log transformation 
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of all the variables except polity index and technological capability allows us to interpret the 
coefficients as elasticities. So, the negative sign of coefficients shows a decrease in the 
incidence and depth of poverty. 
 
In Table 1 and 2, columns (3 and 1) illustrate that higher trade openness is associated with 
higher poverty. This gives answer to the first research question: does trade reduce poverty?  
The present study shows that it does not. The negative and significant coefficient of gross 
domestic product per capita shows that when transition countries become more developed they 
have lower levels of poverty27. A negative sign of the coefficient of private credit shows a 
reduction in poverty headcount, results are consistent with Le Goff and Singh (2014), Beck et 
al. (2007), Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005), Singh and Kpodar (2011) and Quartey (2005). A 
positive sign of trade openness is in good agreement with Topalova (2004), who suggests that 
decline in tariffs is related to higher incidence of poverty in India28. A negative and significant 
coefficient of technological capability confirms Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) findings that it 
is a reason for economic growth, which is negatively associated with “poverty trap” index. 
 
The results of equation (2) from the regression model with interaction terms are presented in 
Table 2 columns (2, 3, and 4) for incidence of poverty. I obtain trade-poverty relationship which 
depends on potential key complementary factor, technological capabilities (column 2 in Table 
2). The coefficient of the interaction term with technological capability (TC) is insignificant, 
suggesting the lack of complementarity between technological capabilities and trade openness. 
Based on this finding, despite greater technological capabilities, higher trade openness in 
transition economies does not influence extreme poverty. The absence of complementarity on 
poverty reduction could be explained by the fact that technological capabilities might not 
enable trade openness to have poverty reducing effects, so benefits of trade openness will not 
outweigh costs when it is accompanied by technological capabilities. A lack of importance for 
poverty reduction is mentioned by Bhalla (2002), who claims that technological development 
is associated with an absolute decline in standards of living of the poor.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Lopez and Serven (2009) find a significant and negative effect of poverty on growth (GDP per capita). 
28 A reduction in tariffs could lead to higher export and import values, which means higher trade openness (IMF, 
2005). 
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Table 2. Trade openness and headcount poverty in transition countries – system GMM 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over three years.  
           Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
         *   Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1%.       
 
   
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Headcount  Poverty (log) 
Benchmark model 
(1) 
Interaction with 
technological capability 
(2) 
Interaction with financial 
development 
(3) 
Interaction with polity 
(4) 
Trade openness (log)                      3.086***                      3.021*** 1.894 -0.985 
          (3.394) (3.358) (0.731)                         (-0.557)    
Health expenditure (log)                           -1.364 -1.382 -1.348                         -1.882*   
                        (-1.607)                         (-1.634)                         (-1.384)                         (-1.959)    
GDP per capita (log)                       -0.666** -0.651** -0.654** -1.246*** 
                        (-2.160) (-2.097) (-2.123) (-3.275)    
Inflation (log) 0.014 0.012 0.031 0.031 
 (0.087) (0.073) (0.189) (0.172) 
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.460* -0.453* -1.779 -0.129 
                                   (-1.825) (-1.798) (-0.469) (-0.474)    
Polity 0.02 0.022 0.011 -1.741*   
 (0.431) (0.441) (0.215) (-1.805)    
Technological capabilities -0.485* -0.58 -0.419* -0.031 
 (-1.864) (-0.253) (-1.727) (-0.102)    
Technological capabilities*trade openness 0.019                   
  (0.038)                   
Private credit/GDP*trade openness  0.285                  
   (0.346)                  
Polity*trade openness   0.381*   
    (1.754) 
Constant -1.691 -1.46 3.635 22.068**  
 (-0.304) (-0.264) (-0.354) (2.343) 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 
Number of observations 144 144 144 144 
Number of instruments  17 17 17 17 
Sargan 0.255 0.325 0.273 0.157 
AR(2) 0.638 0.625 0.550 0.463 
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Results in column 3 of Table 2 suggest that relationship between trade openness and extreme 
poverty could be indifferent in terms of financial development. This finding is in good 
agreement with the specific sector model, which claims that trade tends to lower the real income 
of poor workers in import-competitive sectors and raise those in export-oriented industries 
(contradicts HO). For example, trade openness complemented with financial development will 
increase incomes of poor workers in export-oriented firms at the expense of poor workers in 
import-competing firms, and the overall effect of trade openness on poverty is lost.  
 
Last but not least, I test whether the relationship between trade openness and poverty depends 
on a country’s democratic status. Results suggest that trade openness complemented with 
democratic governance causes higher poverty (column 4, Table 2). According to system GMM 
estimates, as transition countries become more democratic and have a high penetration of 
imports and exports, these together end up with the country having a higher gap between poor 
and rich people, i.e. higher poverty. There is no evidence of complementarities between 
democratic governance and trade based on this analysis. 
 
 
5. Additional Estimates and Robustness tests 
 
The additional robustness analysis of my key results focuses on import and export instead of 
trade openness and checks whether these indicators affect poverty similarly. Results in 
Appendix 10 suggest that higher export and import as a share of GDP are associated with higher 
poverty, which coincides with previous findings in Table 2 column 1. The effect of import as 
a share of GDP on poverty is also supported by Davis and Mishra (2006) and Harrison 
(2006/2008), who suggest that increasing import values might worsen poverty. Moreover, 
based on this study while export as a share of GDP is higher poor become poorer in transition 
countries. The question arises whether this negative effect on poverty is caused by an export 
structure. Exports have a significant effect on economic performance not only because of 
specialization but it is also important to distinguish what types of goods countries trade (Rodrik, 
et al., 2006). In general, higher exports cause more knowledge transfers and positive 
externalities, poor might benefit from that (Harrison, 2008/2013). On the other hand, the 
composition of export might matter for poverty reduction, particularly it is important to take 
into account what you trade.  
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Damijan et al. (2008) studied the export performance of transition economies and focused on 
the structure of merchandise exports of new EU Member states29. They suggest that the export 
structure of the transition countries passed through fundamental changes after transition 
process from centrally planned to market economies. The share of medium and high skill 
intensive manufacturers increased, on the other hand, the share of labor intensive goods 
decreased during 1995-2004. Based on the literature, labor-intensive manufacturers are mostly 
poorer people. Under these circumstances, the poor might become poorer because their shares 
decreased over time, benefits from trade openness will not trickle down to them. The overall 
effect on the poverty depends on the magnitude of the gains from income distribution, goods, 
and services reallocation and also on the structure of foreign trade.     
 
Data of merchandise trade specialization index 30  in transition countries shows that goods 
which are produced by labor intensive, low skill, medium and high skill manufacturers are 
decreasing over time (see Appendix 12). In transition countries, goods are mostly labor 
intensive and produced by low-skilled worker. In recent times, higher-skills are required for 
good production, which becomes more competitive product. So, low-skill manufacturers’ 
position in labor markets deteriorate. Countries which produce low-income goods might not 
benefit from trade openness because they face negative externalities, particularly specializing 
in these types of goods is costly (Rodrik et al., 2006).   
 
The robustness of the findings based on equations (1) and (2) are examined in a number of 
ways. First, an alternative measure of absolute poverty - poverty gap is used in this study. It 
confirms the findings using the poverty headcount ratio 31. Second, when outlier countries32 are 
removed from the sample results still support previous findings for the poverty headcount 
ratio33 and poverty gap34. Third, it is shown that export and import shares in benchmark 
classical poverty model confirm the observations for the trade openness. Results suggest that 
                                                          
29  EU members in our sample : Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania, Romania, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia.    
30 Data were drawn from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics. It 
refers to the degree of specialization in the production or consumption of goods through trade: TSIij= (Xij - Mij)/ 
(Xij + Mij). Where X is export and M is import; TSI is trade specialization index; i and j represent country and 
product respectively. 
31 Sargan tests give a low p_value. The results could suffer from endogeneity problems (see Appendix 11). 
32 See Appendix 13. 
33 See Appendix 14. 
34 See Appendix 15. 
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higher import and export values lead higher poverty levels which are similar to the finding of 
trade openness (sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP). Fourth, dynamic benchmark 
classical poverty model in terms of the key result is similar with classical poverty model, 
particularly greater trade openness is associated with higher poverty and also higher lagged 
poverty leads to an increase in the number of the poor in transition countries. 
 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
 
Poverty is one of the central problems of society. Trade openness is considered as an efficient 
engine to improve economic performance, but still its relationship with poverty is unclear. 
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature on what should be the right way for poverty 
reduction. Based on empirical studies trade openness has both positive and negative effects on 
poverty rates, so the overall effect is ambiguous. However, author of this dissertation derive 
some results how trade maintains larger poverty in transition countries.  
 
By focusing on transition countries paper empirically attempted to answer research questions, 
whether trade openness can actually reduce poverty and if democratic governance, 
technological capability, and financial development might enhance the beneficial effects of 
trade openness on poverty. Potential key complementary factors do not necessarily appear in 
practice in transition countries. The evidence suggests that relying on trade alone is not enough 
to reduce poverty. Furthermore, benchmark classical poverty model estimated shows that 
higher trade openness is associated in fact with higher absolute poverty in transition countries. 
This result reflects that the costs of trade openness outweigh benefits for the poor. Transition 
process from the closed to open economy requires new skills among workers because transition 
countries introduced new technologies on the market (Esposito and Stehrer, 2009). They have 
abundance of unskilled labor and demanding of them decreased over time. Many firms import 
machines to produce goods easily and efficiently, so skilled-labor might be more demanded 
than unskilled labor (Harrison and Hanson, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
 
The study also suggests that potential key complementary factors like financial development, 
technological capabilities, and democratic governance are not necessarily able to ensure 
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substantial reductions in poverty. Higher trade openness is associated with higher poverty when 
government becomes more democratic in transition countries, contrarily to what one might 
expect. The lack of complementarities can be explained by the limitations of potential benefits 
of trade openness on the poor in transition countries. Greater openness to trade has negative 
consequences on poverty reduction and even these broad factors studied here are not enough 
to overrun the negative effect of trade on poverty reduction. There should be other 
complementary factors, such as labor market reform which might potentially be needed for that 
(Topalova, 2004). Labor flexibility is a crucial factor for workers who cannot move easily from 
one sector to another. The majority of transition countries do not achieve high labor market 
flexibility (Svejnar, 2002a). In order to balance unequal effects of trade openness on poverty, 
there should not be any impediments to labor mobility. 
  
This study’s results have some implications for policy in transition countries. They support the 
idea that when firms demand skilled-labor then the poor (completely unskilled labor) will not 
benefit from specialization because they will not be employed in these sectors (Winters et al., 
2006). Dissertation shows that poverty reduction trough trade openness does not have expected 
positive effects in transition countries. Government should balance positive and negative 
effects of trade openness in the short run, otherwise trade openness is not appropriate policy 
for poverty eradication. Therefore, government should take into consideration that the costs of 
trade openness hurt the poor the most, so rich might become richer and poor poorer.   
 
Future studies should consider also labor market flexibility and firm entry-exit flexibility. 
Much work is still needed in order to fully understand how the mechanism works. Natural step 
would be to perform the same type of analysis with these country groups. Based on findings, 
export shares lead to an increase in incidence of poverty. It arises a question about export 
structure and how the poor are affected by exported different types of goods. 
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Appendix 1. Poverty rates and trade openness in transition countries 
 
Head Count 
Ratio at 1.90$ 
Poverty Line                    Mean 
            
Minimum           Maximum 
1990-1992 18.594 0.04 66.58 
1993-1995 12.124 0.02 57 
1996-1998 9.933 0.02 46.76 
1999-2001 12.716 0.01 54.32 
2002-2004 9.628 0.01 42.73 
2005-2007 5.664 0.012 36.3 
2008-2010 2.434 0.01 16.827 
2011-2013 3.045 0.015 29.95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Openness                   Mean             Minimum            Maximum 
1990-1992 71.321 32.103 149.337 
1993-1995 78.174 37.409 136.699 
1996-1998 80.433 32.602 148.232 
1999-2001 88.629 36.922 159.869 
2002-2004 94.443 51.173 135.760 
2005-2007 101.408 51.291 161.103 
2008-2010 98.258 48.064 155.169 
2011-2013 109.337 42.638 177.601 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Poverty Gap 
at 1.90$ 
Poverty Line                   Mean            Minimum           Maximum 
1990-1992 5.785 0.01 24.37 
1993-1995 4.001 0.01 22.4 
1996-1998 3.216 0.01 13.46 
1999-2001 3.708 0.003 17.49 
2002-2004 2.610 0.01 11.79 
2005-2007 1.625 0.003 9.47 
2008-2010 0.728 0.003 5.507 
2011-2013 1.008 0.01 7.76 
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Appendix 2. The diagram below represents two research questions in more illustrative way. 
 
(+) or (-) or insignificant 
 
 
 
 
Then, I examine the potential role of complementary factors: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Trade openness Poverty 
Democratic governance Technological capability Financial development 
Poverty  
Trade openness 
complemented with  
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Literature summary: direct effect of potential key complementary factors on poverty  
Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.1. Effect of Private Credit/GDP on poverty   
Significant: Private credit/GDP Insignificant : Private credit/GDP 
Le Goff and Singh (2014) Guillaumont and Kpodar (2011) 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) Caner and Arestis (2004) 
Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2005) Chigumira and Masiyandima (2003) 
Singh and Kpodar (2011) Fowowe and Abidoye (2013) 
Quartey (2005) Morduch (1999) 
 
Appendix 3.2. Effect of Democracy on poverty  
Significant: Polity Insignificant: Polity 
Oyeshile (2009) Ross (2006) 
Fabella and Oyales (2008) 
(interaction with trade openness) 
Varshney (2002) 
 
 
Appendix 3.3. Effect of technological capabilities on poverty  
Significant: Technological capabilities  Insignificant: Technological capabilities 
Fagerberg and Srholec (2008/2009) Bhalla (2002)  
Ventura (2001)  
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
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Appendix 4. Variable definition and sources 
 
Variables  Descriptions Sources 
Poverty incidence 
The percentage of the population living 
below the $1.90/day international 
poverty line 
World Bank Global Poverty Index 
Database and PovcalNet 
Poverty gap 
The average shortfall of the poor with 
respect to the poverty line, multiplied by 
headcount ratio  
Trade openness 
Sum of exports and imports as a share of 
GDP 
International Financial Statistics and 
World Development Indicators Database 
Inflation 
Annual  percentage  change  in  
consumer prices  
GDP per capita 
Nominal GDP divided by population 
size  
Health expenditure 
The sum of public and private health 
expenditure (% of GDP)  
Private credit/GDP 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP)  
Polity 
Polity  scale  ranges  from  +10  
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic) 
The Integrated Network for Societal 
Conflict Research, POLITY IV Project. 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 
The sum of active number of analogue 
fixed telephone lines, voice-over-IP 
(VoIP) subscriptions, fixed wireless 
local loop (WLL) subscriptions, ISDN 
voice-channel equivalents and fixed 
public payphones World Development Indicators Database 
Internet users 
Individuals who have used Internet  in 
the last 12 months  
PCT international patent applications 
Worldwide patent applications filed 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
procedure  
Research and development expenditure 
Expenditures for research and 
development (% of GDP) are current 
and capital expenditures   
Trademark applications 
Direct resident trademark applications 
which are filed by applicants from 
abroad directly at a given national IP 
office  
Secondary school enrollment 
Total enrollment in secondary education 
 
Tertiary school enrolment 
Total enrollment in tertiary education 
  
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio 
The average number of pupils per 
teacher in primary school.  
Export  
 
The value of all goods and other market 
services provided to the rest of the world 
(% GDP)  
Import 
All goods and other market services 
received from the rest of the world 
(%GDP)  
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Appendix 5. Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Variable 
                                    
Observations                   Mean 
         Standard            
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Poverty   incidence    163 8.028 13.51 0.007 66.58 
Poverty gap 157 2.471 4.452 0.003 24.37 
Trade openness 217 91.033 31.669 32.103 177.601 
GDP per capita 219 4460.393 5064.913 163.073 25184.4 
Inflation 203 64.185 240.088 0.484 2000.948 
Health expenditure 203 57.113 20.983 5.215 90.888 
Private credit/GDP 204 32.220 26.117 2.232 129.838 
Polity 217 3.828 6.239 -7 10 
Technological capability 232 -0.013 0.858 -1.940 1.988 
Import 215 49.815 17.693 14.902 93.570 
Export 215 42.234 16.548 10.595 90.299 
Internet users 190 18.679 22.567 0.003 78.096 
Patent applications 192 7225.234 44405.62 1 552026 
Research and development expenditures 159 0.678 0.456 0.037 2.582 
Trademark applications 196 23199.33 131589.7 1.5 1500000 
Fixed telephone subscriptions 219 19.513 11.917 0.039 50.655 
Secondary school enrollment 204 85.191 18.227 17.327 108.94 
Primary school pupil-teacher ratio 203 19.840 7.641 8.680 55.859 
Tertiary school enrollment 214 37.838 21.315 0.779 90.014 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Poverty 
incidence (1) 1                   
Poverty gap (2) 0.988 1                  
Trade openness 
(3) -0.241 -0.233 1                 
Health 
expenditure (4) -0.553 -0.524 0.127 1                
GDP per capita 
(5) -0.443 -0.394 0.387 0.500 1               
Inflation (6) -0.035 -0.038 0.012 -0.055 -0.186 1              
Private 
credit/GDP (7) 0.123 0.155 -0.154 0.068 0.290 -0.204 1             
Polity (8) -0.576 -0.543 0.355 0.533 0.454 -0.117 -0.085 1            
Technological 
capability (9) -0.357 -0.351 0.204 0.013 0.393 -0.171 0.264 0.222 1           
Internet users 
(10) -0.393 -0.350 0.483 0.291 0.867 -0.214 0.330 0.392 0.607 1          
Patent 
applications 
(11) 0.179 0.147 -0.320 -0.145 -0.106 -0.029 0.438 -0.365 0.087 -0.058 1         
Research and 
development 
expenditure (12) -0.256 -0.230 0.118 0.478 0.603 -0.038 0.414 0.209 0.084 0.386 0.326 1        
Trademark 
applications 
(13) 0.31 0.288 -0.331 -0.184 -0.142 -0.049 0.556 -0.430 0.055 -0.091 0.938 0.304 1       
Fixed telephone 
subscriptions 
(14) -0.584 -0.551 0.158 0.516 0.501 -0.150 0.204 0.393 0.262 0.405 -0.029 0.511 -0.068 1      
Secondary 
school 
enrollment (15) -0.735 -0.723 0.501 0.394 0.544 -0.033 -0.164 0.529 0.383 0.579 -0.298 0.209 -0.427 0.531 1     
Primary school 
pupil-teacher 
ratio (16) 0.443 0.397 -0.18 -0.264 -0.477 0.114 -0.108 -0.429 -0.213 -0.497 0.073 -0.262 0.104 -0.572 -0.566 1    
Tertiary school 
enrollment (17) -0.547 -0.519 0.345 0.304 0.624 -0.128 0.104 0.431 0.535 0.686 -0.178 0.357 -0.283 0.511 0.743 -0.430 1   
Import (18) 0.169 0.200 -0.146 -0.342 -0.065 -0.109 0.308 -0.179 0.118 0.039 0.161 0.022 0.207 0.018 0.062 -0.174 0.129 1  
Export (19) 0.210 0.245 -0.170 -0.228 0.001 0.022 0.314 -0.196 0.036 0.046 0.179 0.053 0.233 -0.065 -0.061 -0.062 0.030 0.804 1 
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Appendix 6. Head count ratio at 1.90$ poverty line by income group 
 
High-income 
countries Mean Minimum Maximum 
Not High-
income 
countries Mean Minimum Maximum 
1990-1992 - - -    1990-1992 21.687 0.62 66.58 
1993-1995 2.071 0.02 6.97 1993-1995 16.313 0.17 57 
1996-1998 1.444 0.02 7.113 1996-1998 14.461 0.03 46.76 
1999-2001 0.842 0.09 2.2967 1999-2001 16.956 0.01 54.32 
2002-2004 0.478 0.073 1 2002-2004 12.857 0.007 42.73 
2005-2007 0.573 0.017 1.52 2005-2007 7.808 0.047 36.3 
2008-2010 0.35 0.01 1.38 2008-2010 3.605 0.01 16.827 
2011-2013 0.522 0.015 1.345 2011-2013 4.792 0.043 29.95 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7. List of the sample countries (28) 
 
 
 
 
 Albania  Kyrgyz Republic 
 Armenia Laos 
 Azerbaijan Latvia 
 Belarus Lithuania 
 Bulgaria Moldova 
 Cambodia Mongolia 
 China Montenegro 
 Croatia Poland 
 Czech Republic Romania 
 Estonia Russia 
 Georgia Slovak Republic 
 Hungary Slovenia 
 Iran Tajikistan 
 Kazakhstan Ukraine 
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Appendix 8. GDP per capita and technological capability (three-year average level over 1990-2013) 
 
 
                                    Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Appendix 9. Overview of the factor scores by country 
 
 
COUNTRY  
1990-
1992 
1993-
1995 
1996-
1998 
1999-
2001 
2002-
2004 
2005-
2007 
2008-
2010 
2011-
2013 
Albania -0.794 -0.821 -0.693 -0.556 -0.152 0.478 1.035 1.716 
Armenia -0.800 -1.110 -0.760 -0.185 -0.033 0.294 1.075 1.318 
Azerbaijan 0.787 0.928 1.050 0.738 0.016 -0.802 -1.027 -1.263 
Bulgaria -0.983 -1.040 -0.667 -0.384 -0.239 0.471 1.014 1.547 
Belarus -0.480 -0.908 -0.954 -0.415 -0.004 0.493 1.008 0.973 
China -0.246 -0.612 -1.218 -0.384 0.245 0.698 1.034 1.015 
Czech 
Republic 
-1.028 -1.066 -0.867 -0.423 0.313 0.532 0.941 1.310 
Croatia -0.58 -1.243 -1.193 -0.434 0.280 0.717 1.018 1.383 
Cambodia -0.523 -0.331 -0.349 -0.453 -0.133 0.140 0.674 0.743 
Estonia -1.788 -1.402 -0.086 0.627 0.636 0.553 0.536 0.731 
Georgia -0.739 -0.551 -0.381 -0.477 -0.228 -0.463 0.259 1.987 
Hungary -1.940 -0.942 0.366 1.189 0.921 0.373 0.013 -0.054 
Latvia -0.949 -1.411 -0.812 -0.172 0.762 1.185 0.693 0.530 
Lithuania -0.962 -1.619 -0.952 0.287 0.746 0.867 0.938 0.568 
Kazakhstan -1.149 -0.553 -1.152 0.140 -0.248 0.492 0.991 1.121 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
-1.019 -0.845 -0.900 -0.601 -0.021 0.974 1.089 1.126 
Laos -1.013 -1.016 -0.681 -0.454 0.092 0.767 1.420 1.230 
Moldova -1.690 -0.895 -0.258 -0.282 0.084 0.637 1.120 1.044 
Montenegro 0.344 0.344 0.344 0.416 0.573 0.393 -0.080 -1.440 
Mongolia -1.270 -1.404 -0.643 0.010 0.289 1.241 1.068 0.477 
Poland -1.798 -1.049 -0.580 0.216 0.555 0.761 0.893 0.907 
Romania -1.644 -1.133 -0.434 -0.108 0.475 1.091 0.983 0.378 
Russia -0.708 -1.193 -0.902 -0.590 0.034 0.587 0.935 1.568 
Slovak 
Republic 
-0.572 -1.302 -0.534 -0.285 -0.090 0.587 1.125 1.202 
Slovenia -0.224 -0.427 -0.772 -0.832 -0.684 -0.000 1.242 1.805 
Tajikistan 0.307 0.158 -0.374 -1.293 -0.914 -0.017 0.420 0.906 
Ukraine -1.022 -1.289 -0.581 -0.541 0.289 0.811 0.983 1.154 
Iran -1.710 -1.076 -0.399 0.369 0.851 1.251 0.348 0.198 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
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Robustness checks and additional estimates 
Appendix 10.  Benchmark classical poverty model  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
          Notes: Data are averaged over three years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
                   *   Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1%.          
 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty 
Headcount (log) 
Benchmark 
model 
(1) 
Benchmark 
model 
(2) 
 
Dynamic 
benchmark 
model 
(3) 
Import (log) 2.333**    
 (2.442)   
Export (log)  2.162***  
  (3.06)  
Poverty headcount (log)t-1   0.254**  
   (2.021) 
Trade openness (log)   2.429**  
   (2.289) 
Health expenditure (log) -1.398 -2.073**  (0.89) 
 (-1.532)    (-2.350)    (-0.762)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.809*** -0.620*   -1.148**  
 (-2.642)    (-1.896)    (-2.402)    
Inflation (log) -0.05 (0.026) -0.052 
 (-0.305)    (0.153) (-0.291)    
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.318 -0.450*   -0.001 
 (-1.242)    (-1.725)    (-0.003)    
Polity -0.022 0.071 0.048 
 (-0.436)    (1.516) (0.948) 
Technological capabilities -0.397 -0.454 -0.28 
 (-1.438)    (-1.591)    (-0.964)    
Constant 4.298 6.341 1.708 
 (0.74) (1.609) (0.333) 
Number of countries 28 28 28 
Number of observations 146 146 112 
Number of instruments  15 15 
 
17 
Sargan 0.127 0.340 
 
0.001 
AR(2) 0.450 0.725 
 
0.229 
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   Appendix 11. Trade openness and poverty gap (alternative measure) in transition countries – system GMM  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are averaged over three years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
          *   Significant at 10%    ** Significant at 5%     *** Significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty Gap (log) 
Benchmark 
model 
(1) 
Interaction with 
technological 
capability 
(2) 
Interaction with 
financial development 
(3) 
Interaction with polity 
(4) 
Trade openness (log)  3.844*** 3.926*** 0.432 -1.106 
 (3.568) (3.627) (0.138) (-0.559)    
Health expenditure (log) -0.249 -0.338 0.43 -1.249 
 (-0.236) (-0.322) (0.335) (-1.098)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.527 -0.526 -0.388 -1.174*** 
 (-1.519) (-1.521) (-1.129) (-2.691)    
Inflation (log) 0.011 0.036 -0.071 0.009 
 (0.06) (0.193) (-0.381) (0.042) 
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.593** -0.606** -5.729 -0.259 
 (-2.024) (-2.058) (-1.208) (-0.835)    
Polity 0.033 0.022 -0.001 -2.346**  
 (0.606) (0.382) (-0.010) (-2.091)    
Technological capabilities -0.498* -1.52 -0.577** -0.018 
 (-1.707) (-0.548) (-2.105) (-0.049)    
Technological capabilities*trade openness  0.233                   
  (0.378)                   
Private credit/GDP*trade openness   1.113                  
   (1.086)                  
Polity*trade openness    0.518**  
    (2.054) 
Constant -11.344* -11.354* 0.944 18.679*   
 (-1.672) (-1.671) (0.078) (1.718) 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 
Number of observations 138 138 138 138 
Number of instruments  17 17 17 17 
Sargan 0.031 0.048 0.048 0.055 
AR(2) 0.788 0.792 0.764 0.547 
41 
 
Appendix 12. The merchandise trade specialization index in transition economies, 1995-2014 
 
 
 
                                                   Source: Author’s own calculation
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Appendix 13. Excluding outlier countries: Azerbaijan, Croatia, Montenegro and Tajikistan 
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Appendix 14. Trade openness and poverty headcount in transition countries - system GMM excluding outlier countries 
 
 
 
Notes: data are averaged over three years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. 
           *   Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1%   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Poverty Headcount (log) 
Benchmark 
model 
(1) 
Interaction with 
technological 
capability 
(2) 
Interaction with 
financial development 
(3) 
Interaction with polity 
(4) 
Trade openness (log)  3.551*** 3.383*** 4.476 -1.837 
 (2.944)                          (2.846) (1.307) (-0.940)    
Health expenditure (log) -2.092** -1.998** -2.376* -2.421**  
 (-2.063) (-1.995) (-1.915) (-2.050)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.673** -0.660** -0.742** -1.193*** 
 (-2.099) (-2.063) (-2.234) (-3.023)    
Inflation (log) -0.23 -0.261 -0.15 -0.127 
 (-1.220) (-1.398) (-0.739) (-0.553)    
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.262 -0.238 1.5 -0.329 
 (-0.993) (-0.893) (0.338) (-1.037)    
Polity 0.001 0.014 0.013 -2.076**  
 (0.022) (0.242) (0.212) (-2.345)    
Technological capabilities -0.959*** -0.144 -0.796** -0.039 
 (-2.765) (-0.058) (-2.576) (-0.089)    
Technological capabilities*trade openness  -0.189                   
  (-0.336)                   
Private credit/GDP*trade openness   -0.397                  
   (-0.413)                  
Polity*trade openness    0.449**  
    (2.242) 
Constant -0.651 -0.419 -3.308 28.770*** 
 (-0.096) (-0.062) (-0.256) (3.002) 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 
Number of observations 132 132 132 132 
Number of instruments  17 17 17 17 
Sargan 0.527 0.557 0.521 0.816 
AR(2) 0.519 0.508 0.687 0.602 
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Appendix 15. Trade openness and poverty gap in transition countries - system GMM excluding outlier countries 
 
 
 
Notes: data are averaged over three years. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
            *   Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%   *** Significant at 1%
Dependent variable: Poverty Gap (log) 
Benchmark 
model 
(1) 
Interaction with 
technological 
capability 
(2) 
Interaction with 
financial development 
(3) 
Interaction with polity 
(4) 
Trade openness (log)  4.166*** 4.272*** 1.664 -2.583 
 (2.917) (2.989) (0.419) (-1.156)    
Health expenditure (log) -0.782 -0.836 -0.324 -1.744 
 (-0.615) (-0.669) (-0.203) (-1.218)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.549 -0.568 -0.453 -1.157**  
 (-1.542) (-1.601) (-1.264) (-2.522)    
Inflation (log) -0.276 -0.272 -0.333 -0.158 
 (-1.290) (-1.271) (-1.484) (-0.598)    
Private credit/GDP (log) -0.264 -0.256 -3.582 -0.42 
 (-0.874) (-0.828) (-0.679) (-1.138)    
Polity 0.03 0.032 0.004 -2.846*** 
 (0.455) (0.448) (0.063) (-2.699)    
Technological capabilities -1.069*** -0.483 -1.076*** 0.037 
 (-2.819) (-0.164) (-3.156) (0.071) 
Technological capabilities*trade openness  -0.133                  
  (-0.196)                  
Private credit/GDP*trade openness   0.719                 
   (0.629)                 
Polity*trade openness    0.624*** 
    (2.626) 
Constant -10.748 -10.889 -1.587 28.083**  
 (-1.278) (-1.279) (-0.109) (2.476) 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 
Number of observations 127 127 127 127 
Number of instruments  17 17 17 17 
Sargan 0.046 0.077 0.074 0.443 
AR(2) 0.812 0.839 0.704 0.789 
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